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INNOCENCE LOST: ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGES AND
POLITICAL EXPERIENCES AMONG THE WEST GERMAN GREENS

The new [character of social movements] does not make its appearance
as a comprehensive program, as a winged utopia, as an irresistable
wave; rather, it manifests itself as an expression of doubt with
respect to current conditions, as an apprehensive search for a more
fulfilling way of life, as new forms of human comm uni cation, as
citizen initiatives against large-scale technocratic insanity, as an
argument involving [those developments] that have not yet been
argued against, as a new map [for society] upon which no final
destination has yet been drawn, one that indicates in any event the
very next stopping point and the township after that.

--Erhard Eppler
Wege aus der Gefahr

A failed connection
11

11

between established political parties as the agents
11

of representative government, on the one hand, and the requisites of the New
Politics grounded in quality-of-life issues, on the other, has contributed to
11

an increase in the protest potential found within the West European industrial
states.1
become

For many environmental protesters of the 1980 s, nuclear power has
1

a

European

metaphor

for

the

destructive

forces

of

unbridled

2

technological_ devel9pmerit and unrestricted corporate growth.
of the newly formed

ecology or

11

Green 11

parties,

Among elements

in particular,

nuclear

technology simultaneously invokes the images of Hiroshima, the China Syndrome,
the Pentagon, Big Science and Big Business in collusion with Big Government;
it moreover calls ·forth visions of economic exploitation and mass deprivation
associated with arms sales to Third World nations.
In surveying what now appears to be a rather well-entrenched coalition of
environmental, peace and anti-nuclear groups, one is tempted to presume a
degree of continuity exists between protest movements past and present.

At

issue -is whether or not the veterans of protest from the late sixties and
early seventies have reemerged from their respecti_ve political closets, intent
on

rallying ·a

"successor

generation"

to

address

long-standing

social

grievances.
Leftist

protesters · of

transformation.

the

1960' s

canipai gned

for

radi caL system

Their frustrations, anger and critiques were directed against·

the performance failures of the capitalist system per se~

Their sense of

urgency has persisted, but it is no longer based on the idealism of protests
part, but rather on the will to preempt the next crisis, for fear that it
could be the last.

The scale, ·the scope and the quasi-institutionalized

character of the protest events that have charged the political climate since
198ff suggest the presence _of something new, as well as something borrowed.

Against the backdrop of the relative ideological purity that ultimately led to
the self-destruction of the s-ixties' movements, protesters of the eighties
appear to comprise a rather motley crew.·

They are inclined to form ostensibly

bizarre coalitions around a complex of disparate issues;· on occasion they have
been known to adopt contradictory strategies and tactics.
adoptin~

and

assimilati~g

riew protest

themes,

In the process of

subsequent- generations of

3

political activists have nevertheless become increasingly conscious of a need
to express their opposition to specific policies through behaviors consonant
with their substantive goals. What is striking about this new wave of
protesters is that they seem committed to taking on the powers-that-be on
their own turf, the environmentalist David assaulting the capitalist Goliath.
They call for a transformation from within, rather than the overthrow of 11 the
system. 11

Nuclear anxieties and postmaterialist values, e.g., the emphasis on

self-actualization and greater individual autonomy, have effected significant
changes in attitudes· towards participation and protest among citizens at.
large.

They have called forth a new sensitivity with respect to environmental

issues, along with new images of progress and reform.
This essay attempts to develop a catalogue of images critical to the
evolution of the Green and Alternative movements in the Federal Republic
of Germany.

Locating the roots of contemporary peace and ecology movements in

the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition
sixties,

the

first

section

(APO)

addresses

experiences of the fifties and

the

question of linkages

between

anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons groups of the eighties; these
links are seen to derive from shared organizational and political learning
experiences.

The second section discusses the emergent body of environmental
II

images prevalent among the Greens, focusing on the constructs of Okopax ~
u

u

..

Okopolitik, Okosozialismus and Okotechnik (that is, Eco-peace, Eco-politics,
Eco-socialism and Eco-technology, respectively).

The essay concludes with a

short synopsis of basic economic, political and environmental relations that
apparently bind protesters to the system while also enabling them to pursue a
rapidly evolving Eco-ideology.
I.

NEW PROTESTS, NEW POLITICS AND NUCLEAR POWER
Protest sentiment in the Federal Republic reached an all-time postwar

4

high during the

11

hot autumn 11 of 1983, both in terms of the intensity of the

debate and the extent of citizen participation in protest events held
-Targeted against the 1979 NATO decision to deploy

throughout the country.

additional theater nuclear forces in Western Europe, a rapidly mobilized peace
movement was quick to find its roots in a thirty-year tradition of peace and
extra-parliamentary protest:2

Peace protests gained momentum in 1952 in

conjunction with proposals set forth by Occupat_ion officials for the possible
rearmament of Germany under an i ntergrated NATO command structure.

Drawing

support from pacifist factions within the Lutheran Church as well as from the
ranks of the German Trade Union Federation, mobilization efforts intensified
in 1957 when

it was learned that rearmament would not be limited

to

conventional weapons -- in fact, by March, 1957 it was discovered that a
number of American-supplied tactical nuclear weapons had already been deployed
on

West German

soil .3

identifiable national

11

Opposition

became

leaders 11 ) by way of a

quasi-institutionalized
11

(with

Fight Atomic Death Campaign 11

that attracted thousands of participants between 1957 and 1959.
By 1958 nuclear arms opponents began to realize that protests articulated
through the normal channels of parliamentary debate, petitions, referenda and
public opinion surveys were unlikely to compel a positive response from Konrad
Adenauer, the

11

Chancellor of the Allies. 11

After losing a critical Bundestag

vote in late 1957, anti-deployment activists resorted to a strategy of
11

extra-parliamentary 11

mobilization

that included

such

tactics

marches, nation-wide May-Day demonstrations and work stoppages.

as

silent

Support from

the Social Democratic Party declined rapidly following a series of electoral
losses at the Lander level, and the forces of organized labor withdrew not too
long thereafter.
It

was

a 1958

Federal

Constitutional

Court

decision

prohibiting

5

Land-level
ultimate

plebiscites on the nuclear issue that led to the movement's
demise.

In

retrospect,

the

"Fight

Atomic

Death

Campaign"

nevertheless proffered an important learning experience for subsequent protest_
generations.

In shifting to unconventional forms of political articulation

and assembly, once the normal channels for participation no longer guaranteed·
recourse, anti-nuclear activists of the 1950 s set an important precedent for
1

a second wave of protesters that emerged in the late 1960's.
Cold War tensions between the superpowers increased considerably at the
outset of the sixties, but the domestic scene remained relatively quiet (by
German standards) during the early part of the decade.

Two major exceptions

were the reactions to the construction of the Berl in Wall in 1961 and the
mobilization of the Easter March movement, modeled after the British Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament.

The Easter Marches initially served as a forum for

protests of conscience revolving around a vaguely defined peace issue but
later developed into a vehicle for manifesting opposition to specific security
policies (after a twelve year pause, the Marches were revived in 1982).
Profiting from the spread of German student protests, March coordinators
witnessed a rapid expansion of their organizational base and, consequently, a
marked increase in their mobilizational capacities.
Rebapitized the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament, the Easter March
movement underwent a substantive transformation as more participants joined in
the struggle against new "Emergency Powers"
Bundestag in May, 1968.

1egi sl ati on

deliberated by the

The new laws were seen to add significantly to the

powers of the Chancellor in the event of a national crisis; this was construed
by opponents as a first step in the preparation for West German involvement in
Vietnam through NAT0.4

Anti-Emergency Powers groups joined students and

others in opposing Bonn's support for the Shah's regime in Iran and backing of

6

American engagements in Southeast Asia.

This fusion of causes and groups gave

birth to a new school of protest-thought more critical of the system as a
whole;

its

outward

manifestation

was

an

Extra-parliamentary

Opposition

movement -- Ausserparlamentarische Opposition or APO, as it was dubbed by its
constituents.
raised

the

While Willy Brandt's election to the Chancellorship in 1969
reformist

expectations

of

some,

the

formation

of

the

Grand

Coalition (1969-1972) was judged by others to have eliminated the prospects
for

voicing

themselves:

"fundamental
hence,

opposition"

dissenters

within

perceived

a

the
need

parliamentary
to

step

chambers

outside

the

established institutions for greater political leverage.5
What began as a

II

free speech" movement at tl1e uni versi ti es soon became a

campaign for a more radical democratization of major political and economic
institutions; this theme -- implying an assault on monopoly capitalism -- was
soon meshed with opposition to alleged American-imperialist encroactiment in
Vietnam.

An ambitious university expansion and reform program was scaled down

· considerably (for reasons described at length elsewhere) ,6 and the Vietnam War
ended rather abruptly in 1972; the level of mobilization among campus leftists
was still quite high, their ideological fragmentation notwithstanding.

About

this time, the newly elected social democratic-liberal coalition announced its
intention to continue with a major nuclear energy plant construction program;
it was

caught off guard when

thousands

of critical,

politicized,

enfranchised citizens suddenly shifted their protest focus

newly

and redirected

their organizational skills against nuclear power and environmental hazards.
The economic shoe~ waves generated by the 1973 oil embargo made the Bonn
coalition all the more determined to continue the development of indigenous
nuclear energy capabilities, despite growing opposition. The post-embargo
recession put a virtual halt to the university expansion program just as an

7

explosion in student enrollments was in full swing; hence, the universities
remained a caldron of political disaffection and_ potential _recruitment gr_ounds
for·ongoing movements.
Many of -those who- had contributed to the

11

·spirit of

1

69 11 nonetheless

completed their personal marches through the academic institutions and moved
on _to the labor market, and to· : 11 real life 11 • issues as we 11 .

Between, 1972 -and

1977, West German society witnessed a transfer of protest momentum--from one.
social

movement to another, as students,

pacifists

and -blooming

environmental

ecologists

destruction.

found

A new form

farmers,
common
of

feminists, - experienced

cause

in

the

threat of

protest organization emerged,

namely, locally-based citizen action groups or sargeri ni ti ati ven (described below).

Res.idents' opposition to nuclear energy plants at specific sites, in

particular, was a driving force in the -proliferation of prate-st initiatives at
the local and regional levels.
The younger,

university-educated

segments

of

the

movement began to

emphasize what they considered to be a logical connection between the dangers
inherent to both the civilian ar\d military applications of- nuclear_ technology.
Leftist and pacifist groups of the fifties and sixties, in contrast, had
responded more- or less supportively to atomic research for civilian purposes
( ~•Atoms for Peace"), at the same time rejecting outright nuclear research and
development of a military character.7

While radical

trade un-ion elements

brought much of the German Trade Union Federation in line with the anti-atomic
marchers of the fifties and sixties and solidified the protest-bonds during
the anti-emergency laws campaign, the spectre of mass unemployment split the
protest front a half decade later; many i ndi vi dual unions were seen to forge
coalitions with pro-nuclear power forces, especially after the 1973 energy
crisis.

-

8

Throughout the seventies, the organizational tactics as well as the issue
focus proved much more effective in rallying the forces of protest with
respect to the Anti-Nuclear Energy movement ( AKK} than had the student and
pacifist movements of earlier decades.

Successful (at least ,temporarily}

efforts to block plant construction at Wyhl, Brokdorf, Grohnde, and elsewhere
conveyed the lesson that smaller, locally based groups ·were able to mobilize
more demonstrators, much faster.
of protest activities

Organizers learned that a decentralization

generated alternative

sources of

information

for

consciousness-raising purposes; it also proved less intimidating to less well
educated supporters whose lives were nonetheless directly affected, e.g., area
farmers, elderly nature lovers.

Smaller units moreover presented an antidote

to a growing sense of bureaucratic alienation and disillusionment with the SPD
at the national level.

Thus, it can be argued that dissatisfaction with

policy outcomes, and a growing demand for more citizen participation in the
policy process gave the AKK movement a dual causa belli.
The first

11

citizen initiative 11 groups formed during the late sixties

(opposing highway construction through a certain neighborhood, or establishing
11

anti-authoritarian 11 day care centers, for example} were viewed at the outset

as political action committees appended to a not-yet-entrenched SPD; their
activism in the environmental field, especially, was expected to complement
efforts to add this plank to the party s platform.

By the mid-seventies, the

1

Burgerinitiativen (BI I s} had become an antonomous force; in view of Bonn• s
commitment to

nuclear

power,

they assumed the

role of a reincarnated

extra-parliamentary opposition in their dealings with the

11

system parties. 11 8

By 1980, there were an estimated 38,000 such BI s in the· Federal
1

Republic, claiming a collective membership of 2-3 million, backed by some 15
million

11

sympathizers. 11 9

They

are

loosely

housed

under

a

national

9

Conf~deration of Citizen Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU) forged
by 15 local

groups in 1972 (now over 1,000) to serve as a communicating,-

coordinating, networking center.
from

the

APO/Long

March

Their ranks include many former activists

generation.

Membership

studies

indicate

that

participants share upper-middle class backgrounds; they are highly educated,
-_often

scientifically

savvy,

critically · conscious

and

self-confident with

respect to their own political-organizational skills.10
years,

Over the last. ten

BI ac_tivists have gradually developed a more systematic political-

critique -of the

perils

and

costs

of

unrestricted

economic

growth

and

technological·, nuclear-based destruction of the environment -- a theme they
have come to share with the born-again peace movement.
Reignited by the NATO Double Decision of 1979, the current anti-nuclear
weapons movement evinces far less ideological purity than did the peace groups
of two _decades ago.
labeled -"the
ecological
movement.

Comprising the grassroots of what has loosely been

movement"

component,

is

and

a
a

strong
small

religious

but

component,

influential

an

expanding_

"alternative culture 11

Thus far, the peace movement appears to have passed through three

identifiable mobilization phases.

Insecurity based on rising unemployment

figures and outbursts of youth unrest set the stage for initial - surges of
peace protest in June, 1981 when some 150,000 uninvited youth descended upon
.the

19th

annual

Congress

of

the

German

Evangelical

Church

in

Hamburg.

Grounded in a growing, albeit .amorphous sense-of existential Angst, this wave
peaked - in a nonviolent demonstration of 300,000 church and ecology -group
activists in Bonn on October 10, 1981.

Statements attributed to Ronald Reagan

concerning the prospects for a conceivably

11

winnable/ 1 limited nuclear war

later - that month gave rise to a second phase, during which nuclear Angst ·
acquired a concrete foundation as Central

European residents discerned how

10

"flexible response" would affect them.

Additional ecological, political and

professional groups began to ally themselves publicly with the peace cause;
their efforts culminated in the June, 1982 anti-Reagan demonstrations in Bonn
and Berlin.

An ex officio national Coordinating Committee dominated the third

stage, when Helmut Kohl's election to the Chancellorship in March, 1983
cl eared the path for the i ni"ti al Pershing II deployments at the end of the
· year.

11

This stage -- saying

No 11 to

a specific

NATO decision -- climaxed wfth

a nationwide "Action Week, 11 October 15-22, 1983 that rallied· 2-4 million
direct participants.
splits

along

The Coordinating Committee, which began to experience

traditional

lines

(i.e., .church
II

hard-core communists and violence-prone

groups

backing

away

from

autonomous" groups, ecology groups

who feared cooptation by Social-Democratic elements), disbanded in November,
1984.

Local

and regi anal mobi 1 i zati on efforts are continuing on both the

religious and ecological/alternative fronts, often overlapping.
The Green Party, formally constituted as a national party in 1980, has
· played an important role, but not the dominant role in the resurgent peace
movement •. Against the backdrop of an estimated 2-3 mill ion peace movement

"

.

·activists, die Grunen boast an official membership of roughly 25,000-30,000; a
larger percentage of support~rs identifies with the Social Democratic Party.11
Nonethefess, by projecting themselves as the explicitly political wingof the
.ecology movement and as the· only party waging an unqualified opposition
campaign

against

recent

and

future

deployments,

impressive electoral gains over the last five years.

the

Greens

have

made

This is especially true

at the state and local levels, the spring, 1985 defeats in the Saarland arid in
Northrhein-Westphalia notwithstanding~12
Resurrected political causes, critical consciousness and newly acquired
organizational

skills

are

now

being

rechanneled

into

the

political.

11

establishment through the Green, Ecology and Al ternativ_e Parties that have
taken root not only in the Federal Republic, but in Sweden, Britain, Franc_e,·
Italy

and

as· well .13

The

electoral

peculiarities

of

the · combined

single-member district and proportionately representative party-list ballots·
used in t~e FRG have unlocked the doors to new parties; but the numerical
imperative of the "5 percent clause" prevented the Greens from crossing this
threshold at the national level until 1983.
nonetheless been substantial.

Regional and local progress has

Pro-ecology parties have thus far attained·

legislative seats in Hamburg (1978), Bremen (1979), in the CDU-stronghold of
ti

Baden-Wurttemberg (1980), in Berlin (1981), Hesse (1981), Lower Saxony (1982)
Schleswig-Holstein

and

Continentally,

(1983).

the

Greens

generated 3.2

percent in the first direct elections. to the European Parliament (1979),
followed by an impressive g: percent showing in 1984 ..
Having attained national repres~ntation for the first time in March, 1983
(27 seats in the. Bundestag); the Greens remain a very loose confederation of
pro-ecology, anti-nuclear, grassroots democrats who lack a coherent ideological
base in the traditi·onal ·(e.g., Marxist) sense.
still

-- as an "anti-party. party/

Characterizing themselves --

they are as committed to

a radical

democratization of the established decision-making structures and procedures,
as they are insistent that substantive policy outcomes rest on
principles.14

government . to

achi e,ve

the

responsibility is to enhance the
parti_cipati<m

deep-ecology 11

To these ends, t;hey have adopted a dual strategy:

official party, they are undertaking the
of

11

sought

by

t~e

11

as an

long march through the institutions 11

latter;

as

an

anti-party,

strength and to open

extra-parliamentary

their

key.

new channels for

opposition ·qua

citizen

initiative forces.
The relative strengths and weaknesses, successes and fail ur_es of the

12

aforementioned··movements leading up ·to the founding of the Greens cannot be
analyzed in detail here.

At a minimum, however, it can- be argued that the

· coalition"."building skills, the sense of political efficacy-and the demands for
greater citizen participation -- all of which have contributed to the fusion
of di verse protest movements in recent years -- are i ndi cati ve that the
political

culture

of

the

Federal

Republic

transformation since May 8, 1945.

has

undergone

a

fundamental

While ecology has clearly become their

pivotal focus, neither the Greens• political objectives nor their images of
postindustrial society are limited to the environmental dimension.

I now turn

to examine four dominant cl asses of images being advanced by the West German
Greens, the rudiments of an emerging Eco-ideology.
IL

ECO-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE RISE OF THE SUPERINDUSTRIAL STATE
A.

Organi zatj anal ·dynarni cs

The Green and Alternative List (AL) Parties are tied to each other and to
many_additional protest groups by virtue of their common emphasis on autonomy,
direct participation, solidarity, environmental compatibility, transparancy of
decision-making and variety.
are

free-Greens,

red-Greens,

multicolored-Greens,
ideological. line·s
forwards. 11 15

Diversity is reflected in the fact that there

by

though

brown-Greens,

members

proclaiming

have

they move

tried
11

to

black-Greens
avoid

splits

neither left nor

and
along

right but

Disparate positions regarding the acceptability of more radical

direct action tactics ~nd the role of violence produced significant confusion
among the ranks during the early eighties, although this issue has apparently
since been laid to rest.16

The Alternative List-Berlin t>est exemplified this

ambivalent stance in midsummer, 1982.

After expressing its public support. for

an illegal anti-Reagan detnonstration involving punks, squatters and assorted
11

autonomous 11 r~dical s, · the AL had to - crawl

out from under· the debrfs --

!

13

-1
literally and· figurativeiy -- following a retaliatory firebombing of its
headquarters.17
Even · more si gni fi cant, however,

is the ongoing struggle between the

· Party I s two major factions, the environmental Fundamentalists or
.the political

pragmatists. or

11

Realos. 11

11

Fundi s 11 and

The· main point of contention is

whether· or not Greens would compromise

their own

principles

and betray

grassroots elements· by joining in a coalition with the Social
. Party. · The

11

Fundis 11 are unwilling to accept formal positions within such a

government under any circumstances, while the
participate under specific conditions.
11

Democratic

11

Realos 11 would be willing to

The tendency up to now has been to

tolerate 11 a minority SPD government; two of the mo.re actively· cooperative

experiments conducted in Hamburg and Hesse lasted less than a year.
the SPD has proved capable of securing an absolute

Now that

majority in the Saarland

and in Northrhein-Westphalia· (spring 1985), the question mqy become a moot
11

one.

Moderate 11 Greens who stand opposed to a reideologiz~tion and renewed

left-right polarization (in contrast to an ecology-first orientation) distance
themselves from the orthodox communists, the
called

the K-groups,

the

latter

intra-party niches, now labeled
With respect to the

11

11

have

11

relics of yesteryear.II

nonetheless

carved

out

Formerly
their

own

Group Z. 11 18

fa.iled connection 11 mentioned at the outset of this

essay, one can argue that through the late 1970 1 s and early 1980 1 s ( given the
resurgence of protest and the violence associated with it) , that the West
German SPD seemed to expend more energy distancing itself from its own radical
youth wing, the J usos, than it did cul ti vati ng new recruits.
director Peter Glatz summarized the problem thus:

11

SPD executive

The Party awak.ened· false

hopes- that parties could change lives and alter the rel a:ti onshi ps among human
beings. 11 18

With respect to recent German devel opmerits, Gl otz and others now

14

11

picture a society divided into

two cultures" -- the political establishment

and the "alternative scene. 11
Who or what -is

11

alternative 11 -has consequently become the new-64 million-

D~Mark question, as political
Joseph Huber points out.
11

scientist -and Netzwerk _Selbsthilfe cofounder

The- 11 alternative 11 spectrum encompasses a plethora of

people, milieus, motives and opinions. 11 20

11

The

second culture 11 appears to

consist of three strata, with three strategic orientations.

Neither the Long

March nor the APO strategy has been completely abandoned by the politically
disillusioned of the eighties.

Their strategic repertoire has in

expanded by-the addition of the

11

drop-out 11 option.

limited to the teen and squatter scene.
many former sixties'
·individuals

live

in

a way

been

The last category is not

A more low-profile variety includes

activists and once-radical
Wohngemeinschaften,

buy

commune

dwellers.

their -Musli

and

These

bread

in

alternative shops, patronize cooperative bookstores, read only newspapers from.
leftist presses, baby-sit iri -- anti -authoritarian day-care
small sel_f-organized businesses,_view old Bogart movies in

centers,. work in
11

off-cinemas;" and

are ultimately proud of the fact that they have had no contact with
outsi de 11 for several years .21

11

the

Among the consciously organized groups, a few

are radicalized, some operate nation-wide; many are depoliticized, all are
dec_en-trali zed and deci dely post-materialistic.
in politics locate along an ideological

Those who continue to engage

spectrum stretching from left-wing

social democratic, to radical democratic, to ant~-parliamentarian.
Alternative groups concern themselves with everything fr:om
- sects

to

therapy groups,

from

agricultural

religious -

life-styles to urban welfare

services, from civil liberties to Third World initiatives.

Huber estimates

that- there are over 11,500 projects in the FRG, involving 80,000 activists.
·If- all

sympathizers

are

taken

into

account,

the figure

falls

between

15

300 ,000-400 ,000.
11
--

The breakdown of project types finds 12 percent devoted to

production, 11 70 percent to

11

services 11 and 18 percent pursuing "political

work 11 ; 29 percent entail handwork, 71 percent of the projects call for mental
labor.22

From this vantage point, the_ amou!'}t of.media coverage devoted to the

estimated 25 ,0.00-30 ,000 registered Greens over · the last few years has been.
quite disproportionate to the degree of influence they actually command within
the

alter·nativ'e,

protest

and· citizen

initiative

movements.

A sin:iil ar

disproportion exists with respect to ·the Greens and the West German peace
movement, the dimensions of which I now turn t.o consider.
II

B.

Okopax

For obvious historical reasons and because of its now-powerful standing
within the European-Community, the Federal

Republic has come to occupy a

pivotal position among the Western peace movements.

A widescale deployment of

Soviet SS-20 1 s carried out in 1977-78 induced then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
-- an outspoken opponent of nuclear weapons during the 1950 1 s -- to push for a_
US response to the Warsaw Pact moderni z_ati ans.
discussions,

based

on

perceptions ·of

European theater, was the NATO

11

Soviet

The outcome of subsequent
nuclear

superiority

in

the

two-track 11 decision of December 12, 1979.

The kaleidoscopic ~ature of the anti-nu~lear prot~st coalition dictated a
lowe·st common denominator strategy in the determination of peace movement·
goals in the FRG through 1983:

the single share·d objective was the prevention··

of the initial deployments following the breakdown of US-Soviet negotiations
in Geneva.

The common. conviction was and remains that additional

theater

nuclear forces will render the Federal Republic a "ground zero 11 in the event
of a superpower confrontation.

But the

ta'cti cal .quest;-ons regarding the

future course of the movement are unresolved, now that the "minimal conse_nsus 11
on No-to-Pershi ngs has self-destructed.

Individual groups hold conflicting
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opinions with

respect to

disarmament agreements_.

the

desirability of unilateral or multilateral

They differ internally as well as externally as in

regard to the definition of parity and the logkal

limits of de"terrence.

Supporters are divided over whether · or not to demand simultaneous reducti ans
in the Eastern bloc, and uncertain how to d~al with nuclear proliferation in
the Thi rd World.

No cl ear· answer eme·rges to the question whether or not a

build-up of conventional forces offers a morally or politically .acceptabl_e
alternative.
feasibility

Nor does one . discern a single position with respect to the
of

a

nuclear-free

zone,

prospects

for

alternative . defense

concepts or the inevitability of a political;..bloc concept of security.

It has

therefore been necessary for organizers to avoid mobiiizing around a single
political party, which could put an end to the tenuously balanced mass base.
tmergent tensi ans are nonetheless judged to be 1ess 1ethal than the prospects
of a nuclear exchange.

Perhaps the movement's most important contribution to

date rests with the fact that it has ended a 40-year tabu on a public debate
of national security issues.
Green

images bearing on .the relation between peace and ecology are

intellectually grounded in the works of Robert Jungk, Jonat_han Schell and
Erhard.Eppler.

Jungk's 1977 book, berAtomstaat, painted a vision of-advanced

industrial futures dominated by "nuclear energy imperialism," the hazards of
which allegediy know no bounds.23

In spelling out the relationship between

the need for guarantee<;! energy supplies and question~ of national security,.
Jungk maintained_almost a decade ago:
From now on, any discussion of nuclear technology must confront the
i s·sue that there cannot be any separation · of its peaceful
military implications.

and

Recognition of this fact has come slowly --

perhaps too slowly -- but the weight of experience ·allows no other
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conclusion.24
·11 eco-peace 11

Hence,
component.

evinces

both

an

international

The_ focus is not limited to the potential

and

a

domestic

destruction of the

phy~ical environment, but al so encompasses a grave threat to civil liberties
in light of possible acts of nuclear terrorism or domestic sabotage.
sounded the ominous warning,

clearly; the atomic age is made to order for

Such ·governments are not plagued by citizens I i nqui ri es

totalitarian states.
or protests _-•25

11

Jungk

He anticipated

II

the· creation of a new type of man· or woman

who would function as tirelessly~ insensitively, and automatically as a cog in
a mac hi ne 11

--

the

II

l i veware 11

(

II

as opposed to

hard" or

II

software 11 ) of nuclear

technology.26
Schell Is

refl ecti ans

on

The Fate of the Earth- · have

supplied

the

bi al ogi cal underpinnings for the fears of noel ear destruction among European
ecologists already fueled by the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.27
Schell

develops

the

empirical

case

for

Jungk's

thesis

that

the

major

difference between nuclear destruction and other industrial or toxic accidents
rests with the complete irreversibi_lity and the much. lo_nger range nature of
the consequences such an

11

accident 11 will inevitably produce.

The prospects of

a "nuclear winter 11 represent the ultimate linkage· between· peace and ecology
policies

pursued

by

n_ational

governments,

thus - linking

domestic

with

international concerns.
In his search for
connections

outlined

II

the ways o·ut of danger/ Eppler has echoed many of the
in

the

Brandt · Coinmission 1 s · North-South Report,

emphasizing the threat to global peace posed by arms proliferation, capital
exploitation and human suffering in.underdeveloped nations.28

Formerly a high
.

.

ranking Social Democratic Party official, Eppler stresses the relation between
domestic unrest and the lack of meaningful employment opportunities at home.
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He moreover dismisses as untenable the proposition that disarmament can be
achieved _only through the development and deployment of ever. more horrendous
and

sophisticated · weapons

systems,

based on

depersonalized," computerized

Techno-Commandos intended to sanitize the ultimate political-military,decison.
ti

Eppler al so touches upon a dimension· of the Okopax phenom·enon that_ has
gained

in

salience and

German.;.national

or

11

notoriety

over

neutro-nationalist 11

the 1ast few years,

foreign

policy

the

thrust behind the peace movement ..

Survey data indicate that Greens and their supporters are
decoupling· German

namely,

priorities

globalized wranglings of the two superpowers.

from

the

interested in

self-interested,

A 1981 survey showed that 70 of

100 Green voters were prepared to become or al ready were actively involved in
the peace movement; while 52 percent rejected the NATO Double Decision- in
particular, 82 percent supported.the concept of a neutral· Germany in general,
committed to nei_ther the Atlantic nor the Warsaw alliance, only a slight drop
from the 85 percent who oppose outright the construction of additional nuclear
energy p1ants. 29

The .· emphasis on a German wi thdrawa 1 from NATO

is

not

universally shared by constituent groups within the peace movement, however.
A February, 1983 poll analyzed by Ratti nger found 73 percent of the Greens
questioned ( 66 percent for the SPD and FOP, and 40 percent for the CDU,
respectively) opposed to any new deployments in the FRG.

Asked whether ·NATO

is/is not necessary for German security in May, 1983, 56 percent of the Greens
responded affirmatively, 43 percent negatively.30
The. Federal

Republic has witnessed a proliferation of public opinion

surveys on security-related topics si nee 1980.

The fact tliat during the

preceding thirty five years, citizen~ had virtually no say in either the
decisions to deploy theater nuclear forces or to develop nuclear energy.
capabilities has figured significantly in the political image advanced by the
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Greens, considered next.

c

~Okopol
- i ti k

The Greens recognize ongoing threats to the eco-:-system as the product of
a persisting set of sociopolitical power relations; in short, what policies
are adopted are seen as a function of how political decisions are formulated
The quality of a democracy is perceived to depend on its

and implemented.

ability to ful fi 11 a number ·of subs tan ti ve as well· as· procedural prerequisites:
simultaneously.

The political and programmatic alternatives advocated by the

Greens are founded upon four

11

pillars 11 : the New Politics will be ecological,

conducive to social welfare; decided in· a grassroots,

"

.

{okologisch, sozial, basisdemokratisch, gewaltfrei).

non-violent manner

Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, ·

·Joseph Huber, and Martin Janicke offer cogent summaries of.Basisdemokratie as

a statement of

prindples for a threefold democraticization.

At issue are 1)

the extension of participatory rights throughout advanced industrial society
at large; 2) the redefinition of. party-representation and majority-minority
relations

within

parliament;

party-internal · democracy.

and

3r

the

es.tablishment

of

greater

Time and space constraints permit only a brief

· synthesis of their findings here.31
In their 1980 federal platform, the Greens defined grassroots politics as
a development leading to the strengthened implementation and actualization of
decentralized, direct de'!1ocracy, in a way that ensures the Basis {grassroots)
pre-eminent influence in the decision-making process·.

Decentralized units·,

easy to monitor and electorally accountable at township or county levels are
to be guaranteed autonomy and the right to self-determination.32
With respect to the democratization of society-at-large, Green supporters
call for. the repeal of numerous statutes inhibiting free speech { specifically,
·:~88a,

§90~,.~~d

h3oa of the Criminal Code} that have ·frequently been invoked
.
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by the state to intimidate citizens protesting nuclear energy and construction
of the now infamous airport runway in Frankfurt, Startbahn-West.33_ They call
for a strengthening of the federalist pri nci pl e, to warrant a steady fl ow of
financial

resources to the re9ional, communal .and local

increased

access

to

the

information

collected

levels~- and for

and· used

by

county-1 evel officials for the purpose of land-use pi anni ng.
faction
polling,

al so

expresses

referenda

strong

and

support

other

for more

frequent

plebiscitarian

state

and

At least one
util iza ti on of

instruments.

eco-politicos recognize the need to democratize economic as well

Finally,
as state.

power structures through extended participatory rights at the workplace.
The 1983 national

elections allocated ·27 seats (5.6 percent) to the

Greens, entitling them to active participc1.tion in the Bundestag for the first
time since their founding in 1980.

While direct representation in parliament

can be construed as a major mobil i zational victory, the - Greens view their
involvement in parliament as but one aspect of their ·commitment to a dual
political

strategy.

·Although they continue in .the sixties'

tradition of

instigating a "long march through the institutions," the Greens ascribe only
secondary importance to. their . parliamentary engagement; the more important
function of engagin~ citizens in acts of extra-parliamentary opposition rests
with the Burgerinitiativen who compr1se their electoral constituency. -Labeled
everything from an "Anti-Party Party" · to a "Party of the New . Type/' - the
Greens-in-Parliament remain half movement-half party~ committed -to the role of
"fundamental

opposition,"

notwithstanding.

The

their

ambivalence

Greens· seek

to

regarding

destroy

the
.

coalition

politics

"information-barriers"
,

.

.

erected by self-interested bureaucrats, lobbyists and establishment-oriented
media, in an effort to render parliamentary decision-making more transparent.
In stark contrast to the anti-democratic charges mounted against them by
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II

leading elements of the

system parties, 11 Green supporters ar~ue ~hat an

extra-parliamentary emphasis should not be equated with an anti-parliamentary
orientation.
indicates

The need to i den ti fy with a party of their · own making sooner
a

fundamental

commitment

to

democratic·

institutions

and

constitutional principles.34
Ecopolitical eleme~ts argue that an internal democratization of existing
party

structures

is

a

prerequisite

participatory opportunities.

for

the

maximization

of

external

Hence, measures to attain ·a higher. level of

internal· party democracy have led the Greens to adopt six rules for the
establishment of ·a "party organization of the new type. 11
Mitgliederoffenheit -

Membership

and

participation· in official

committees. and . plenary sessi ans are open to all.
Parliamentary delegates are required to vote
determined by the membership' plenum.

They include:

11

1)

meetings

2) Imperatives Mandat -

the party line" at all times, as

3) Rotation -

All political offices are·.

subject to the rota ti on of their respective occupants, on a two to six year
basis, whereby an i ndi vi dual office-holder may be granted a one-time-renewal
II

under extraordinary or extenuating_circumstances.

.

II

.

4) Keine Amterhaufung - No

accumulation or simultaneous office holding is permittec:l, e.g., combining
posts in party and government or entertaining a position of leadership at both
the local

and

regional

level.

5)

Ehrenamtlichkeit -

Office holders are

entitled to compensation for official expenses; in some cases they may receive
a salary amounting to no more th·an the average wage of a ski 11 ed 1 aborer.

The

remainder of one 1 s MP earnings are paid into the party coffers to cover
extraparliamentary

expenses.

Delegates

consulting fees or personal honoraria.

are

not

permitted

to

collect

6) Minderheitenschutz - Protection of

minority groups within the party is to follow from th_e procedural emphasis on.
consensus building, in contradistinction to the majority vote principle.3,5
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In theory, all
principle;

deci si on-making occurs on the basis of the consensus

debate

in

the

local

and

plenary

assemblies

( Mi tgl i edervol l versamml ungen) continues until a common position emerges.

With

two years I experience in the Bundestag and three to five years of direct
engagement at the land and local levels now behind them, the costs of a strict
adherence to these principles have become all too apparent (e.g., lack of
experience).

In - particular,

the

rotation

principle

has

generallj

been

subjected to reformulation to permit delegates to complete at least one full
term.
Elected -

representatives

are

often

caught

between

internal

direct-democratic procedures ( requiring them to check back frequently with the
Basis), on the one hand-, and the imperatives of the parliamentary process
(calling for an emergency or unscheduled vote) , on the other.

A decision to

abstain until a consensus has evolved at -the grassroots may sooner serve the
purposes of an even less acceptable partner than the SPD, namely, the CDU
government.

Orders

to

boycott

specific

parliamentary

debates

in_ those

instances where all the available policy alternatives are deemed unacceptable
by the base denies Green delegates the

right to

be

taken

seriously as .

legisl_ators in the long run •. - The anti-professionalization stance that is
implicit in the rotation principle hinders effective parliamentary action, as
delegates have already discovered with respect to the Bundestag committees and
caucuses

where

most

of

the . legislation

tends

to

be

pre-formulated.

Furthermore, the larger the regionally-based parties grow, the harder it-will

be

to adhere to "_fundamentally.,.democratic 11 decision procedures.

Consensus- is

much harder to reach in a plenum of several thousand·than in one of several
hundred.

Michels' spectre of oligarchy lurks in the political wings.

The ultimate barrier to a redistribution ·of political

resources and
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opportunities, however, is just as likely to lie in the structure of economic
power, where a number of alternative conceptions have ·also begun to evolve.
D.

ll

Okosozialismus

Critics

have

sought

to

disparage

the

Greens ·among

potential, more

conservative constituencies by designating them a i•melon party" -- green on
the ~utside, red on the inside. · The juxtjposition of an environmental focus
and an ideological consciousness becomes especiallyevident in the debate over
ecological

preservation versus economic growth.

Green elements are fairly

united in their rejection of Western monopoly capitalism and the perpetuation
of socio-economic inequalities it engenders; but they are just as adamantin
their rejection of the Eastern models of "real existing socialism" (with the
exception of "Group Z11 adherents).
the

context

II

of · many

The entrepreneuiial spirit evinced ~ithin

al ternati ve 11

projects

speaks

to

an

image

of

an

ecologically-sound "free market" ·that has in fact been liberated from vested
conglomerate interests.

The state is not . expected to

11

wi ther away, 11 but it

will have its regulations and supervisory functions redefined.

In short, the·

Greens are not interested in the kind of head-on confrontation with either
11

capitalist 11 or

11

communist 11 ideology that served as their quixotic windmill

during the late sixties.
One member of the Eco-socialist camp, exiled GDR-dissidentRudolf Bahro·
testifies that the Greens are. perhaps· not as ideology-free as they might
presume.

Bahro

holds

guarantee of survival
remain attainable.
survival

that the

11

Soe1alists

need

the Greens

because the

i.s the condition under which their objectives . of old

The Socialists are likewise needed by the Greens, because

can. only. be

assured

when

the

driving mechanisms

ol· monopoly

competition have been rendered inoperative. 11 36
But the economic planks set down in the party's 1982/83 platform (e.g.,
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plaris to revise the patent laws to prevent.themonopolization of scientific
innovations by a particular ·interest-bloc, to provide for independent sources
of consumer.information) also convey an implicit compatibility with certain
fundamentally llcapitalist 11 principles.

The emphasis is .on demonstrating that

environmental conservation need not. be sacrificed on the al tar of .economic
growth.

As Eppler contends, the two are highly interdependent, not mutually

·exclusive options:·

· If economics is the lesson of managing households and budgets, and
[ the search for] a method to· utilize scarce resources purposively
and effectively, if ecology deals with the ·relationshi.ps of living
.,

things among

each other

and with

their organic and nonorganic

environment~ then it does not follow from the definition, why the
two must necessarily stand in contradiction to each at.her.
all, we know from

After

biol ogfsts that nowhere are materials and energy

more efficiently budgeted than in nature ••.• When ecology asks how
living beings -- including human beings -- should behave in relation·
to each other, if their existence and their variety are to be
secured; if economics is really supposed to question how mankind can
come to

those g(>ods and

services

it needs with a minimum

of

investment~ then the presumption emerges that a rational approach to
economy and rati anal use of ecology. have more to do with each other
than we have.been conscious of-to date.37
The tentativeness of core elements of the Greens' economic platform is
best illustrated by the description of their pol icy objectives regarding
taxes, currency,

securities and capital-financing.

Whereas all

of their

priorities and. initiatives_ under the subheadings of labo·r market, technol_ogy,
energy, peace, agriculture, etc. take up two pages each in the Bundesprogramm~
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11

under

Taxation ••• 11 · stands only the cursive note,

is still being [reviewed and] revised. 11 38

11

this part of the platform

Insofar as the economic platfo_rm

advanced by the Greens is not yet as fully developed as the ecological agenda,
learning to live with the apparent· inconsistencies between· the two positions
cited above is simply part of what it takes to become and to remain a Gree_n
Party member.
Members do agree that selective growth, not wasteful competition an'd .
unfettered industrial expansion, is the key to environmental preservation, one
that can provide a· source of new employment opportunities . as well.

The

interdependent character of economics and ecology is manifest even- in those
instances where the two _might appear to feature a classic confrontation:
citizens opposed to the construction of Startbahn-.West, for example, have seen
II

·fit to adopt

system-conform 11

ec_onorni c arguments;

they note the cost of

mi 11 ions of trees destroyed ·to benefit an investment whose profitability
remains a dubious propos{tion in light of rising fuel
airlines deficits.

prices and growing

Similarly, arguments against the skyrocketing costs of

nuclear reactor construction -have been used to turn the tables on proponents
of the

11

hardpathll energy alternative.39

Eco-socialism, in contrast to the more orthodox Marxist position, does
not amount to a call for state ownership· of the means of production or even
control by a

11

vanguard 11 party..

On the contrary, the focus is on the social

function as well as on the redistributive aspects of new modes of enterprise.
Based on
function

the concept of
comprises

an

self-help,

attempt

11

to

the

economically· solidaristic social

provide

alternative and complementary

services in an increasingly bureaucratic, professional and inflexible social
and medical system; and to indicate ways in which to compensate the decay of
traditional

family. structures with new ways of· living together ..•. 11 40

In
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other words, although the Greens have not yet forged a consensus with respect
to a preferred set of economic structures and relationships, it is clear that
any balance between market forces and state subsidization they may eventually
deem acceptable will have to proclaim as a primary·aim the enhancement of the
11

quality of life. 11
In distinguishing prospective

11

new enterprises 11 from more conventional

forms of market interaction, political scientist Hans Maier looks beyond those
businesses· whose activities are limited· to filling particularistic. consumer
gaps through new or improved products, e.g., the baker who begins to sell .
whole-wheat

bread

to

Wonderbreads 11

sold

eco-socialist

economy

accommodate · those

in

supennarkets.
by

proposing

dissatisfied · with

Maier
three

sets

the

criteria.

11

the

parameters

un1form
for

an·

A truly alternative

entrepreneurial system is one that promotes:- 1} the development of new models
of property ownership which $erve to transform the conventional owner/employee
relationship;

·2}

the

development

of

new,.

collective-

models

of

work-organization among colleagues that downplay hierarchy and incorporate
flexible work-hours; 3) the planning, production and distribution of goods and
services deemed socially safe and useful, as well

as the development of

ecologically and socially adjustect·technologies and production processes.41
The .overall organizational thrust i~ geared toward the.creation of a more
decentralized, humanized· working environment,
large organisation. 11

From this

11

small

11

to achieve smallness wi.thin

is !)e_autiful 11 orientation, one may

correctly infer that the writings of E. - F.

Schumacher are an off-quoted·

source, if not required reading for.eco-entrepreneurs.42
small,

self-managed

enterprises.

rests

on· a

belief

The preference for
that

democratic

decision-making can only occur in the presence of decentralized economic
relations.
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But decentralization is no substitute for capital formation, and small
businesses as a rule are less likely to find easy ·access to credit.

Hence,

one question that provokes dissension among many ecol ogy-minde(i producers is whether or not to accept state -subsidies for alternative proje-cts.

Some fear

cooptati on, others are adamant in their rejection of the system as a whole.
Netzwerk Selbsthil fe_ has

provided

one

alternative

source

of capital

for

projects, based on sympathizers' voluntary contributions to a multi-purpose
fund.

Their

erratic

criticisms

of monopoiy

capitalfsm

notwithstanding,

eco-activists have also been known to make trips to the public troughs, about
which some are more red-faced -than others.

Huber estimates that less than 40

percent of the organized "alternative" projects are self-financing, while 30
percent receive direct subsidies from church or state institutions and another
30

· percent

are

dependent

upon

indirect

"solidarity.:..collections 11 and private incomes.43

subsidies,

grants,

As Maier points out, however,

those who reject any form of state subsidization may in fact be the most
politically consistent among the alternative
11

drop-out 11 lifestyle itself reflects a total

producers,.

insofar as their

rejection-. of _the system and,

therefore, a radical concept of political economy.
Neither Huber nor Maier overlook the class dimension inherent to the
creation of a· secondary or "dual" economy.

On the one hand, many of those

seeking greater personal fulfillment in seJ f-owned and -operated businesses
are representatives of a new,· professional middle class who lack neither the
motivation nor the ski 11 s necessary to pursue the alternative careers route.
These are the true "post-material i_sts 11 who have enjoyed so much academicattention of late_.44

But the alternative economy.-also draws a significant

number of recruits from the ranks of the socially marginal, e.g., unemployed_
youth, po ten ti al

delinquents,. drug users and Ausgefl i pp ten,. embittered or
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. resigned academics. 45
alternative
11

business

Self-Help Network 11

While attempts
ventures

and

to

incorporate the broad array of

projects

into. a

loosely

coordinated

system (replete with its own financing mechanisms and

revenue sources) may enhance their ·economic sfgni fi cance in the short run,
some fear that the network can· just as easily be reduced to a .kind of
surrogate welfare system, relieving both. the state and the private market of
their
11

social

security

and

service

responsibilities.

·rn

light

of

the

...,.

self-help 11 orientation, it is not surprising that the conservative CDU has

offered both moral and fi seal support· to alternative entrepreneurs in Berlin.
for example.46

The theoretical

parallels aside, the- actual

products .and

12

technologies advocated _by Okosozialismus proponents are less likely to enjoy
.the widespread support· of more conventional industrialists, however.

E.

ti

Okotechnik

Not surprisingly·, the works of Alvin Toffler as well as the Global 2000
Report compiled

under

the

Carter Administration

are

frequently cited in

European ecological circles -- probably to a greater degree than they are in.
their country of origin.47

Techno-optimists find themselves pitted against

Eco-pessimists, Zero-Growthers and Pro-Thi rdworl ders, in a confrontation that
has been rendered much more direct by the reverberations of the i973 energy
crisis •.

Efforts

to move beyond crisis management to more comprehensive·

reforms have iri part been stymied by divisions within the scientific community
called upon to weigh economic consequences against ecological imperatives.

At

the basis of an Eco-technological image of society is a recognition on the
part of the Greens that,_ rather than juxtaposing the dictates of Nature and
.Technology, there is a pressing need to determine the proper relationship
between the two.

Ecologists no longer concentrate on a generalized·criticism

of all forms of technology and innovation; they object instead to ·_specific .·
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technologies,

especially

those

controlled

by

major

corporate

powers •

.Criticisms stem from those who have participated in technological development.,
. as well as from groups immediately affected by it.
technology

involves

not

solely

negative

Moreover, the reaction to

criticisms,

but

also

positive

recommendations and alternatives (outlined below), which have only become
possible through the processes of advanc~d industrialization.
11

The premise behind Eco-technology advanced by Hub·er is that
alternatives
industrial

in

the

industrial

society. 11 48

This

society,

position

there

is

are

analogous

no
to

there are

alternatives

to

the mixed-economy

inclinations cited earlier . . The objective is not to wipe out the system per
se, but to go far beyond a mere treatment of disruptive symptoms in the body
politic . . No one can afford to or wants to _oppose ecology openly.

The main

problem

kind ·of

is

environmental
11

1 imits

to

one

of. establishing

a

consensus

policies and prescriptions will
growth"

climate

is

expected

to

regarding

what-

benefit society most.
have

a

braking

The

effect

on

superindustria.lization, that is on the spiraling development measured in terms
of "ever more, ever further, ever bigger and smaller, ever harder ... "49
If

.

The long journey to the .1 and of Okotechni k, according · to its theorists,
must begin with the not-so-small task of dealing with the pollution problems
of here and now, initially, at least, the attainment of this objective will
require the enlightened regulatory services of the state.
most primitive· form,

of Eco-technology. entails - the disposar of garbage,. ·

chemical and nuclear wastes.
water

The primary, if not

The techniques range from burning to filtering,

treatment, . soundproofing,

rechan.nel i ng

effluents,

etc.

The

second

category of eco..:.techniques incll,!des the sorting, reprocessing and recycling of
organic and nonorganic substances, such as plant waste, paper, glass, old oil,
thermal wastes and electrical

conversion.

The third level calls for more
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scfentifi c measurement and more rigorous record-keeping with · respect to the
effects of toxic substances in water, in the air and food chain9 and on climate~

ranging
from satellite
This would permit controlled experiments
.
.

observations down to genetic research.

Eco-technologies would be applied to

improvements

revitalization;

in -the

areas

of urban

local,

regional

and

international transportation systems; ~nd the promotion of alternative energy
policies.

The

emphasis

11

on

soft

paths,u

e.g.,

-solar,

would

permit

·decentralization, providing both new jobs and greater citizen control, in

.,

contrast to capital-intensive, centralized

11

hard paths, 11 vizq nuclear energy .

Okotechnik proponents such as Hµber and Toffler have interjected the new

concept

of

.. 3--D

· growt h.: II

Durchbrechertechnologie,

Dienstleistungsokonomie (preakthrough technology,
indust~ies).50

The

11

breakthrough 11

character

of

dual

Dualwirtschaft,

economy and service

Eco-technology

looks

to

microelectron·ics, biomass/biochemistry, telematics. genetic technology, sp~ce
colonization, a:nd labor-saving computerization.
that advances

in

the

high-tech. fields

In other words,· they presume

need· not be detrimental

to

the

eco-system by definition; conversely, concerns for the environment may be seen
to stimulate new types and new applications of advanced tec·hnology.
The images of a society dominated by· such eco-technological wonders are
·not, of course, shared or welcomed by - all_ who identify with the Green and
environmentalist groups, e.g., elements ·of the
to a zero-growth strategy.

11

Eco-Right 11 ·who are committed

The common position that does emerge is that

alternatives are available, that·the risks involved in non-action are greater
than those inherent to innovation and reform, and t~at the costs of preserving
the environment should fall primarily to those who have in the-past socialized
abuses and injuries while privatizing p·rofits.
further

~hare

Greens and their sympathizers

a belief that the assessment of environmental

risk

is

a
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political process in and of itself.
of potential

Attempts made to

II

quantify 11 risk in terms

human casualties, safe levels of physical

exposure to toxic

substances, or even in terms of maximal financial liabilities for public or
private sector actors -- based on imprecise indicators at best -- often
obscure an unfair distribution of risk among diverse segments of society.
Qualitative

variables

receive

little

attention

measuring devices, as defined by the system.
as an integral component of

11

11

for

lack

11

of

accurate 11

Political ecologi1 is perceived

political economy, 11 fusing social-legal rights

with technocratic interests and assessments of likely econom,c outcomes (e.g.,
the cost of clean-ups versus the price of accident prevention}.

Jungk 1 s

vision of a nuclear police-state offers one illustration of a possible failure
to weigh the risks of maiming loss and limb against a permanent loss of civil
liberties.

Under the emerging ecological paradigm, the burden of proof would

necessarily fall

to the risk creator, who would have to demonstrate that

potential technological benefits outweigh actual,

11

acceptable 11 , risks.51

The four images outlined above, -- as unrefined as they may appear on
particular points -- are but the pillars upon which the environmentalist
11

vanguard 11 (in Milbrath 1 s terms} hope to construct a new society.

Implicit in

the discussion of these four images are two additional dimensi ans which have
yet to evolve separately, but which this author believes nonetheless provide
distinct rallying points and potential linkages for the panoply of coalescing

.

social

movements.

They

are

ii

Oko-feminismus

••

and

Oko-internationalismus

(Eco-feminism and Eco-internationalism, respectively}; for reasons of space
these constructs cannot be developed here, but both have accounted for some
rather dramatic media coverage during the relatively short life-span of the
Greens .52

The key question is whether either the actions or the images of

this young but feisty party will leave its imprint on the political system at

---7
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large.
IV.

INNOCENCE LOST:

POLITICAL EXPERIENCES AND THE GREENING OF GERMANY

Protests movements are primarily reactive in nature and hence cannot be
divorced from the socio-economic environment in which they unfold.

Moreover,

opposition movements in recent decades have rarely developed in •isolation from
one other.

In the short-run, protesters inay fail to achieve specific movement_

objectives.

However, this does not preclude the possibility of successfully

effecting less easily discernible.changes in the long-rim, either in public
consciousness or in the structure of political opportunity.
and

assimilation· of

themselves

to

certa.in

develop·. a

11

protest

sense

of

experiences 11

the

can

evolutionary

The integration
lead

participan.ts

character -of

their

movements.
The

purpose

of

this

paper

was

to

shed

light

on

the - changing

socio-political context that has fostered the growth of the German ·11 Green 11
movement, as well as to present its images of an alternative society which
cannot be divorced. from a complex web of international, political, economic
and technological developments.

While the images and strategies adopted by

West German anti-nuclear groups find their·roots in earlier protest movements,
· they have undergone a_ significant transformation.
irreconcilable
preface

11

eco. 11

ideological

differences

have

begun

What were once viewed as
to

conv_erge

under

the

The most si gni fi cant dimensions of that transformation can

only be quickly summarized below.
The days are gone wh.en poli tit al leaders could try to compare the ecology
movement with earlier, single-issue protests~ such as the campaign against the
1968 Emergency Legislation, in· the hopes that protests would die down witli
time or get lost in a plethora of other social problems.

The unifying factor

among protest movements and citizen initiatives· of the 198O 1 s is no longer· an

I

I
·1I
,I
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overarching ideology, typifying· the century-old struggle between the socialist
left and
procedural

the capitalist right.

More

important are the

substantive and

connections that participants are discovering as each movement

evolves, with environmental

issues_ providing a centripetal

force.

Neither

anti-nuclearis(!l nor political alienation per se can be seen as the key issue
that has driven the German public into the arms of alternative movements.
best, one can argue that the sixties' call to

11

At

dare more democracy 11 directed

the active public's attention to environmental· issues which, upon closer
socio-economic scrutiny, fueled their sense of bei,ng shut-out of the political
decision~making process.

Proteste~s• substantive and procedural demands· have

become mutually reinforcing.
The rudimentary Eco-ideology outlined above is significant in that it
holds the potential _for binding together the many and sundry social movements.
that have crossed the West German political stage over the last ten years.
But the Greens have a long way to _go before they can ·be expected to pr_oduce an
internally consistent, politically comprehensive platform. · After all, as a
Party the Greens are only five years old, ·and are just as entitled to commit
political· blunders
_ parties.

and

Furthermore,

tactical
their

miscalculations

fundamental

as

the

commitment to

precludes the adoption of a majority-imposed ideology.

so-called

system

self-determination
In fact,

real· diffetences between these .groups. sho~ld not be seen

11

the many

as a sign of

weakness, but as proof of the movement'svitality. 11 53
11

Eco-activists have played down the repressive character of
in the ·recognition that the end of the industrfal system as

we

capital ism 11

know it also

portends significant changes in the existing economic structures.

It is· not

only ~apitalist corporations and multinationals, but large-scale rirganizations
in general that are being rejected in favor of self-help projects and communal
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arrangements.

West German activists of the eighties are much less naive about
11

accepting further_ technological

progress 1i as the solution

to fundamental

social problems; but neither do they accept technological development as the
exclusive domain of traditional, profit.;.seeking interest conglomerates.

They

oppose the abuses and i nequi ti es perpetuated by capitalist domination over _the
production processes (as well as those filed under "real existing socialism").
Ironically!· they are nonetheless outspoken proponents of the personal freedoms
· and self-actualizing consumer -choices that capitalism in theory claims to
guarantee.

If

Toffler 1 s

and

Huber• s

reflections

on

the

"third

wave, 11

the

· post-industrial/high-tech revolution, heral_d the end of advanced industrial
_society as we know it, the~ this transformation will also mean an end to the
system- of party pol iti.cs that has prevailed to date.

[\s _early as 1977,

· Johanna Strasser came to the conclusion _that slower economic growth and -less
affluence need. not automatically or inevitably result in the decline of
democracy, a ·point likely to meet with strong but ambivale.nt reaction in a
twice-devastated Germany.54

The converse woul_d al so appear to hold, that

higher rates-of economic growth an~ greater wealth (the Wirtschaftswunder) is
not

perceived· ·to

have

automatically

guaranteed

participatory democracy and personal freedom.

today. 11-~5

1 arger

measure

·of

With·respect to the question of

balance between growth and freedom in the 1980 1 s,
find lies in personal

a

11

the an_swer one hopes to

engigement and in the political

actions undertaken

Participation is· the lifeblood of the movement that recognize_s each

individual as ari indispensable
As · Marcuse

predicted

11

expert 11 in relation to his/her own needs.

over

a

decade

ago, • environmental

and

protesters have learned that political power brokers and economic forces
cannot be pushed aside, they must becombatted on their own grounds.

peace
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This means that, from the beginning, the personal and particular
.

.

_liberation, re·fusa1·, withdrawal must proceed within the political
context, defined by the situation in which ·the radical oppositfon
finds itself, and must continue, in the theory and the practice, the
radical- critique of the Establishment within the Establishme~t.56
11

Therein lies the significance .of

innocence lost. 11

The relations between

politics, economics· and ecology must extend beyond the limits to i.ntimacy
heretofore imposed by either the right or the left.
future, it can · only do ·so by losing its
11

cannot call for a
for

the

benefits

II

return to the pastures. 11
it provides and

If ecology is to have a

i hdustri al innocence , 11 viz., it
It must accept industrialization

find ways of minimizing

the

inherent

environmental ·and human· risks •. The future growth prospects of business artd
industry, in turn, will depend on their ability to adapt to a· wide range of
environmental concerns and constraints.

The relation must become a reciprocal

one, which the Greens believe can only be achieved on the basis of qualitative
· changes in th.e structure and function of political and economic power.
Huber 1 -s conclusions with respect to the German Greens in particular can
easily be extended·to West European environmentalists in general:
One thing is clear, who claims to be a
much.

11

Green 11 today doesn 1 t tell us

The Greens are. everywhere. · But what kind of· Greens are

they? ••• Do

they

wish

to

escape

from

hi story

and

break

with

industrial development, or do they wish [to participate in] another.
development of· industrial
industrialism,
antithesis.

and

in· the

society?
final

Ecology is not the end of

analysis,

it is

not even

its

Rather, .ecology is the destiny of industry and its

further fulfillment.

Ecology has lost her political innocence. She

must now reveal her true colors.57
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The kaleidoscope of orientations that lie at the root of this emerging
Eco-ideology will make the tasks of revelation and synthesis difficult to be.
sure.

The potential benefits to be derived. from the al_ternative future(s)

,,

projected by these Oko-im_ages suggest that it is a task worth -undertaking
nevertheless·.

Given

the

interdependent

character

of

the many

pressing

probl e!iJs that have dominated the campaign agendas of even the system parties
since the creation. of the Greens especially acid rairi, NATO deployments and
structural unemployment, this task may amount to an exercise in survival -for' the parts as well as the whole.
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